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NOTES AND COMMENT
CORPORATIONS AND ACCOMMODATION PAPER.
The first sentence of Section 55 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law reads as follows: "An accommodation party is one who has
signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor or indorser, with-
out receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name
to some other person." In the past, the ambiguous wording of this
sentence has caused much conflict ' and confusion 2 as to the meaning
of "an accommodation party". The long overdue Morrison's Pill was
supplied recently by a judicial interpretation of this sentence which
fixed the word, "instrument", as the logical antecedent of the phrase,
"without receiving value therefor". 3 It follows, therefore, that an
accommodation party is one who receives no consideration for a nego-
tiable instrument which he has signed with the intention of lending
his credit to another party.4 Consequently, the fact that an accom-
modation party receives consideration for signing the instrument does
not change the status of such party.5 Such change of status occurs
only when the supposed accommodation party receives value for the
instrument. 6
I BRANNAN, THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (4th ed. 1926) 29; Ames,
The Negotiable Instruments Law (1901) 14 HARV. L. REv. 241, at 248; Ames,
The Negotiable Instruments Law. A Word More (1901) 14 HARV. L. REv.
442, at 445; Brewster, The Negotiable Instrunwnts Law-A Rejoinder to Dean
Ames (1902) 15 HARV. L. REV. 26, at 29; (1931) 5 CINN. L. REv. 115; (1931)
9 TEX. L. Rav. 601.2 Dench & Hardy Co. v. Hanson, Inc., 247 App. Div. 355, 287 N. Y. Supp.
435 (1st Dept. 1936) ; McQueen v. First Nat. Bank, 36 Ariz. 74, 283 Pac. 273
(1929) ; BRANNAN, 1OC. cit. supra note 1.
'Carr v. Wainright, 43 F. (2d) 507 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930); see 1 DANIEL,
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (7th ed. 1933) 216, where it is said that, "* * * the
term 'value' relates to value for the instrument, and not to the loan of the name
by way of accommodation."
'Cf. 1 DANIEL, 10C. cit. supra note 3; 1 POPE, LEGAL DEFINITIONS (1919)
11; 1 WORDS & PHRASES (4th series) 45; BREwsTm, op. cit. supra note 1, at 32
(accommodation paper is paper without consideration).
'Where after corporation gave two notes on purchase price of land to
vendor, payee believing that, if president of corporation would indorse notes and
make himself personally liable for their payment, payee could negotiate notes,
agreed to pay president $1,667 for his indorsements by crediting said amount on
one of the notes. The payee was thereafter unable to sell notes and sued
president on his indorsement, but was not entitled to recover because president
was the accommodation indorser, and payee was the accommodated party. Carr
v. Wainright, 43 F. (2d) 507 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930); Nat. Park Bank v. German-
American etc. Co., 116 N. Y. 281, 22 N. E. 567 (1889); Bacon v. Montauk
Brewing Co., 130 App. Div. 737, 115 N. Y. Supp. 617 (1st Dept. 1909) ; McGhee
Inv. Co. v. Kushner, 71 Colo. 137, 204 Pac. 891 (1922) ; Cook v. American
Tubing & Webbing Co., 28 R. I. 41, 65 Atl. 641 (1905).
' In an action against a corporation as an indorser of a promissory note
the defense that the corporation was an accommodation indorser and that plain-
tiff was aware of that fact was not available, in view of the fact that the con-
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These principles are applicable to both corporate and individual
accommodation parties.7 Therefore, an appreciation and a strict ap-
plication of these principles will necessarily make for a better under-
standing of the nature of the authority and liability of a corporation
in regard to accommodation paper.
I.
A consideration of the extent of a corporation's authority to act
as an accommodation party reveals three types of corporate accom-
modation paper:
1. Where a corporation extends its credit to another corpora-
tion or individual by executing, accepting or indorsing a negotiable
instrument gratuitously, such corporation is a party to gratuitous
accommodation paper.
2. A more common type of corporate accommodation paper can
best be described as non-gratuitous. This type of paper is character-
ized by the receipt of some consideration or security by the corpora-
tion for the loan of its name.
3. Another type of corporate accommodation paper results from
those transactions whereby the corporation may or will receive, for
the instrument itself, a benefit, which is so remote as to leave un-
affected the corporation's status as defined by Section 55 of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law.
It is seldom that a corporation possesses express authority to
act as a gratuitous accommodation party." And in view of the courts'
sideration for the note was a check made payable to the corporation. Rosenberg
v. Bekenstein, 200 N. Y. Supp. 296 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 1923); Carr v.
Wainright, 43 F (2d) 507 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930); Goodman & Suss, Inc. v.
Rosenthal, 137 Misc. 704, 244 N. Y. Supl. 242 (1930) ; McQueen v. First Nat.
Bank, 36 Ariz. 74, 283 Pac. 273 (1929); Warren Nat. Bank v. Suerken, 45
Cal. App. 736, 188 Pac. 613 (1920); Gardner v. Holcomb (Cal. App. 1927)
255 Pac. 523; Bazer v. Crummett, 16 La. App. 613, 135 So. 54 (1931); Boll-
scheiber v. Packer House Hotel Co., 83 N. J. Eq. 459, 91 Atl. 1027 (1914);
Thompson v. Whitney & Marsh, 17 Hawaii 107 (1905).
Dench & Hardy Co. v. Hanson, Inc., 247 App. Div. 355, 287 N. Y. Supp.
435 (1st Dept. 1936), wherein it was said: "There is nothing in the section
(§ 55) which indicates that it is applicable to an individual only and not to a
corporation." Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. S. Voremberg Co., 245 Mass. 317,
139 N. E. 482 (1923) semble; New Hampshire Nat. Bank v. Garage & Factory
Equipment Co., 267 Mass. 483, 166 N. E. 840 (1929) semble; Nat. Bank of
Newport v. Snyder Mfg. . Co., 117 App. Div. 370, 102 N. Y. Supp. 478 (4th
Dept. 1907) semble. But cf. Oppenheim v. Simon Reigel Cigar Co., 90 N. Y.
Supn. 355 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 1904).
'Where a charter expressly provides that the corporation may act as
an accommodation party, such provision covers all types of accommodation
paper.
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traditional reluctance to imply such extraordinary authority, only the
broadest charter terms will move the courts to recognize inferentially
the existence of such right.9 The rule is well settled that the courts
will not imply authority to act as a gratuitous accommodator merely
from a general right to issue and indorse negotiable paper.10 The
reasons for the courts' antipathy 11 against obligations of this kind are:
first, gratuitous accommodation paper is based on no consideration
and, therefore, the issuance, acceptance or indorsement of such paper
would amount to a gift of the corporate funds; secondly, the corporate
funds can be used only for those purposes expressly or impliedly pro-
vided for in the charter, and in the absence of such authorization, a
gratuitous accommodation would amount to a fraud upon the stock-,
holders who are the ultimate owners of the corporate funds; and
thirdly, the rights of the creditors of the corporation would be simi-
larly prejudiced by such transactions which obviously are not within
the prescribed scope of its business. 12
Whether implied authority to become an accommodation obligor
exists where the corporation possesses an express right to become
surety or guarantor is not certain. However, there is some indication
9 A corporation was held to have the right to become an accommodation
indorser where it was chartered to engage in a general brokerage and financial
business, and authorized to engage in any business transaction commonly
carried by capitalists, promoters and financiers; to indorse promissory notes and
other commercial paper; to assist financially or otherwise corporations, individ-
uals and others, and give any guaranty in connection therewith for the payment
of money; to lend money or credit to, and aid in any other manner, any person
or corporation. Bennett v. Corporation Finance Co., 258 Mass. 306, 154 N. E.835 (1927); cf. Farmers & Traders Bank v. Thixton etc. Co., 199 Ky. 69,
250 S. W. 504 (1923), where charter power "to do any other thing which is
usually done by persons engaged in like business" was held not sufficient to
authorize a trading corporation to become an accommodation indorser. Mc-
Caleb v. Borne Elect. & Mfg. Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) 173 S. W. 1191 (a
corporation "for the accumulation and loan of money" has no authority toindorse notes to raise money for another corporation) ; Fremont Nat. Bank v.
Ferguson & Co., 127 Neb. 307, 255 N. W. 39 (1934) (the provision that a
corporation may exercise all the powers which a natural person could do is
limited by the other provisions of the charter) ; Dench & Hardy Co. v. Hanson,
Inc., 247 App. Div. 355, 287 N. Y. Supp. 435 (1st Dept. 1936) sentble.
In Taliaferro v. J. S. Cowart & Sons, Inc. (Ga. App. 1933) 171 S. E. 406,
it was held that a corporation could not accommodate in the absence of express
authority so to do.
1 Cf. Nallen Land & Investment Co. v. M. & P. Bank of Villa Ricca, 178
Ga. 818, 174 S. E. 618 -(1934).
' In Morton v. Lovell Bldg. Co., 43 Wyo. 81, 297 Pac. 799 (1931), it was
said that, "The authorities make it perfectly clear that the issue or indorsement
of negotiable paper by a corporation for the accommodation of another is
ordinarily ultra vires." Monument Nat. Bank v. Globe Works, 101 Mass. 57(1869).; CooK, CORPORATIONS .($th ed.) 3523; 1 DANIEL, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 440; 3 THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS (3d ed.)
992.
" Globe Indemnity Co. v. McCullom, 313 Pa. 135, 169 Atl. 76 (1933);6 FLETCHER, CYc. CORP. (Perm. ed. 1931) 456.
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of a trend 13 towards the adoption of a rule which would permit all
those corporations to accommodate gratuitously which have either
charter or statutory 14 authority to become surety or guarantor.
If the act is one of accommodation in the strictly technical sense,
consideration received for the loan of the corporate signature in no
wise changes the nature of the act. 5 Nor would the acceptance of
security by a corporation for its becoming an accommodation party
to negotiable paper remove the corporation from the statutory defini-
tion. 6 That there is no distinction between a corporation's authority
to accommodate gratuitously and its authority to accommodate non-
gratuitously is evident. The same general rules are, therefore, ap-
plicable to both.
It would seem that where a corporation receives indirect bene-
fits for the pledge of its credit, the transaction is nevertheless one of
accommodation in the strictly legal sense.17 Although the same rules
that were used in connection with the other types of corporate ac-
commodation can again be used, nevertheless this third type presents
much difficulty.
'One authority maintains that, "A corporation is not precluded from
issuing or indorsing paper for the benefit of another where it has the power,
express or implied, to become surety or guarantor." 6 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra
note 12, at 454. To the same effect see 14a C. J. 734.
In Thomas v. E. G. Curtis Sons Co., 7 F. Supp. 114 (D. C. Mich. 1934),
the court said by way of dictum: "Furthermore, the court is inclined to inter-
pret the statute of Michigan (allowing corporations to become guarantors) as
including power to execute accommodation papers." But see Note (1934) 33
MIcH. L. REv. 94, which criticizes this conclusion.
" Section 10-i of Art. 327 of MIcH. PUB. AcTs OF 1931 which provides:
"Every corporation * * * shall have power to guarantee * * * evidence of
indebtedness created by, any other corporation * * * ". For a list of similar
provisions in sixteen other states see Note (1934) 33 MIcH. L. REv. 94, at 96.
Cf. N. Y. STocK CoRP. L. § 19 (guaranty of bonds).
I "Accommodat on apes not often issued gratuitously **'.Gardner
v. Holcomb (Cal. App. 1927 255 Pac. 523; Nat. Park Bank v. German-
American etc. Co., 116 N. Y. 281, 22 N. E. 567 (1889); Cook v. American
Tubing & Webbing Co., 28 R. I. 41, 65 Atl. 641 (1905). See Bacon v. Mon-
tauk Brewing Co., 130 App. Div. 737, 742, 115 N. Y. Supp. 617 (1st Dept.
1909).
" In the absence of a charter giving such power, an accommodation indorse-
ment given by a corporation is ultra vires, though it takes security for its
supposed liability. Carlaftes v. Goldmeyer Co., 72 Misc. 75, 129 N. Y. Supp.
396 (1911).
"lit re Bankers' Trust, 27 F. (2d) 912 (D. C. Ga. 1928) ; Farmers and
Traders Bank v. Thixton etc. Co., 199 Ky. 69, 250 S. W. 504 (1923); Western
Maryland Ry. v. Blue Ridge Hotel Co., 102 Md. 307, 62 Atl. 351 (1905) ; W. C.
Bowman Lumber Co. v. Pearson (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) 139 S. W. 618;
Colman v. Eastern Counties Ry. (Eng.) 10 Beavan 1 (1846); 7 Am. & ENG.
Ewcyc. oF LAW (2d ed. 1898) 789; see Central Trans. Co. v. Pullman, etc. Co.,
139 U. S. 24, 58, 11 Sup. Ct. 478 (1891) ; cf. Thompson v. Whitney & Marsh,
17 Hawaii 107 (1905), where the court said: "It is enough if the benefit is
received indirectly, provided always that the indorser's object in making the
indorsement is a legitimate object in connection with its regular corporate
business."
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This difficulty is caused by the inability of the courts to draw
any well-defined borderline between those transactions which will di-
rectly benefit the corporation and those which will indirectly do so.
1 8
At one extreme, there are to be found those transactions whereby
benefits accrue to the corporation "by way of reaction", and at the
other extreme, those transactions which directly benefit the corpora-
tion. Between these two extremes, there exists a shadowy middle
ground of no mean proportions. The decisions and textbooks have
attempted to fix a line of demarcation by resorting to various defini-
tions and tests.19 A study of these reveals a number of guiding prin-
ciples which will now be considered.
All the authorities agree that a corporation may pledge its credit,
if such pledge is reasonably necessary in the conduct of its business.
20
Under such circumstances, the corporation might be "accommodat-
ing" another.21 However, since the corporation is directly interested
in the transaction, the courts would label the corporation "more than
a mere accommodation party".2 2 Actually, this is a misnomer; the
corporation is not an accommodation party for it receives value for
the instrument.23
" The same situation exists in regard to contracts of suretyship and guar-
anty. See 6 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 12, c. 26.
" Cf. MORAWETZ, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPOIRTIOS (1886)
§ 362, where the author states: "No rules can be framed which would be of any
practicable value in determining cases of this character * * *"
THenderson Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gregory, 16 F. (2d) 589 (C. C. A. 8th,
1926) ; A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. et al. v. Brown, 71 F. (2d) 745 (C. C. A.
4th, 1934); McQueen v. First Nat. Bank, 36 Ariz. 74, 283 Pac. 273 (1929);
Talmadge v. Clewiston Iron Co., 252 Ill. App. 508 (1929) ; American Surety
Co. of N. Y. v. 14 Canal St., Inc., 276 Mass. 119, 176 N. E. 785 (1931);
Fremont Nat. Bank v. Ferguson & Co., 127 Neb. 307, 255 N. W. 39 (1934);
Ellis v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 25 N. M. 319, 183 Pac. 34 (1918) ; Holmes, Booth
& Haydens v. Willard, 125 N. Y. 75, 25 N. E. 1083 (1891); American Nat.
Bank & Trust Co. of Danville v. Kushner, 62 Va. 378, 174 S. E. 777 (1934).
For other cases see 6 FLETcHER, op. cit. s.pra note 12, at 457, n.10.
"If there is sufficient consideration accruing to the maker of the note, he
is not an accommodation party in the legal meaning of the word, even though
he signed for the "accommodation" of another. McQueen v. First Nat. Bank,
36 Ariz. 74, 283 Pac. 273 (1929).
Talmadge v. Clewiston Iron Co., 252 Ill. App. 508 (1929) ; cf. Bacon v.
Montauk Brewing Co., 130 App. Div. 737, 115 N. Y. Supp. 617 (1st Dept.
1909); Dench & Hardy Co. v. Hanson, Inc., 247 App. Div. 355, 287 N. Y.
Supp. 435 (1st Dept. 1936).
The same vague use of the word "accommodation" is found in A. Leschen
& Sons Rope Co. et al. v. Brown, 71 F. (2d) 745 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934), where
the court, quoting from the defendant's brief said: "It is recognized that an
ordinary business corporation has the power to give an accommodation indorse-
ment if made for a proper corporate purpose." However, after deciding that
the note in question was indorsed for a proper corporate purpose, the court
corrected itself by saying: " * * in this case the elements of accommodation
were lacking in the indorsement the corporation gave."
'See note 6, supra, and the following cases: In re John Rose Co., 275
Fed. 416 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921) ; In re Boston Confectionery Co., 282 Fed. 726
(D. C. Mass. 1922) ; Irwin v. Colburn. 56 Cal. Ann. 41, 204 Pac. 551 (1921) :
Talmadge v. Clewiston Iron Co., 252 Il. App. 508 (1929) ; Bollschweiber v.
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It is perfectly clear that a corporation which binds itself by nego-
tiable paper for the benefit of another is not an accommodation party,
if there be a reasonable expectation that its legitimate business will
thereby be directly protected or advanced. In determining whether
negotiable paper which a corporation has issued, accepted or indorsed
is accommodation paper or is for the protection or advancement of
the corporation's own interests, the courts look to the substance of
the transaction and not merely to its form.24  The courts, applying
these principles, have recognized a corporation's authority to bind
itself by what seemed to be accommodation paper in the following
classes of cases:
(a) Where the corporation assumes what appears to be the obli-
gation of another, whereas, in fact, it is the obligation of the corpora-
tion itself; 25
(b) Where the corporation receives a large addition to its assets
in consideration of its execution, acceptance or indorsement of com-
mercial paper to pay the debts of another; 26
(c) Where the corporation indorses the notes of its debtor to
enable the latter to improve his business position and to increase the
prospect of such debtor paying his indebtedness; 27
(d) Where the corporation extends its credit in an effort to save
itself from a loss imminent under some lawful contract; 28
Packer House Hotel Co., 83 N. J. Eq. 459, 91 Atl. 1027 (1914); American
Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Danville v. Kushner, 162 Va. 378, 174 S. E. 777(1934) (an indorsement made by a corporation for the advancement or protec-
tion of its own interests is .not an accommodation indorsement).
For what constitutes value see N. I. L. § 51.
1 "In determining the character of the obligation assumed courts look to
the substance of things." American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Danville v.
Kushner, 162 Va. 378, 174 S. E. 777 (1934).
'A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. et al. v. Brown, 71 F. (2d) 745 (C. C. A.
4th, 1934) ; In re Boston Confectionery Co., 282 Fed. 726 (D. C. Mass. 1922).
Accord: Linsky v. Bay Machinery Co., Inc., 266 Mass. 139, 164 N. E. 916(1929)..
'Nat. Bank of Commerce in Denver v. Allen, 90 Fed. 545 (C. C. A. 8th,
1898) ; McQueen v. First Nat. Bank, 36 Ariz. 74, 283 Pac. 273 (1929).
La Grange Lumber & Supply Co. v. F. & T. Bank, 37 Ga. App. 409,
140 S. E. 706 (1927); Fremont Nat. Bank v. Ferguson & Co., 127 Neb. 307,
255 N. W. 399 (1934). Accord: Ellis v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 25 N. M. 319,
183 Pac. 34 (1919); Hess v. Sloane, 66 App. Div. 522, 73 N. Y. Supp. 313(1st Dept. 1901); cf. Lyon, Potter & Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Sioux City,
Iowa, 85 Fed. 120 (C. C. A. 8th, 1898) (the intra vires nature of the transaction
is not changed because the transaction proves unwise) ; Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Rosenberg Sons Co., 36 Cal. App. 773, 173 Pac. 404 (1918) (transaction held
intra vires even though the pledge of credit was greater than the actual debt).
But see Bacon, Dawson & Co. v. Farmers Bank, 79 Mo. App. 406 (1898);
Kelly, Maus & Co. v. O'Brien Varnish Co., 90 Ill. App. 287 (1900).
' Ellis v. Citizen's Nat. Bank, 25 N. M. 319, 183 Pac. 34 (1918), where
the court said: "* * * and the fact that it (pledge of credit) may redound
incidentally to the benefit of another does not invalidate the transaction." Cf.
1938 ]
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(e) Where the corporation assumes the obligation of another in
order to obtain complete performance of a contract made for a proper
corporate purpose; 29
(f) Where the corporation pledges its credit for the purpose of
assuring the prompt performance of a contract which will result in
immediate and substantial 'benefits to the corporation; 3
(g) Where the corporation assumes the business debts of an in-
dividual whose business it has taken over; 31
(h) Where the corporation acquires the business and capital
stock of another corporation, and executes its notes in exchange for
the notes of the latter; 32
(i) Where the corporation controls another corporation and exe-
cutes, accepts or indorses negotiable paper for the benefit of its sub-
sidiary; 83
(j) Where the corporation assumes the obligation of a valuable
employee for the purpose of retaining him; 3 4 and
Woods Lumber Co. v. Moore, 183 Cal. 497, 191 Pac. 905 (1920) (guaranty),
discussed in (1920) 19 MICH. L. Rlv. 216; N. Texas State Bank v. Crowley-
Southerland Com. Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) 145 S. W. 1027 (guaranty).
' American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Danville v. Kushner, 162 Va. 378,
174 S. E. 777 (1934) ; cf. Harrison v. Union Pac. Ry., 13 Fed. 522 (D. C. Mo.
1882) (guaranty) ; Conn. etc. Ins. Co. v. Cleveland etc. Ry., 41 Barb. 9 (N. Y.
1863) (guaranty).
3' Where a land development corporation undertakes to secure the establish-
ment of a steel plant at a town site that is being developed, and its officers
indorse notes before delivery to the payee in consideration of the prompt
establishment of the steel plant at the site of the development, it is more than a
mere accommodation indorser and jts indorsement was given for a valuable
consideration. Talmadge v. Clewiston Iron Co., 252 Ill. App. 508 (1929).
'Curtis, Jones & Co. v. Smelter Nat. Bank, cited in 6 FLETCiHR, op. cit.
supra iwte 12, at 459; 10 Cyc. 1111, subd. (d) ; cf. Hall v. Hunter Bros., 90
Hun 280, 35 N. Y. Supp. 769 (1895) ; id. 157 N. Y. 694, 51 N. E. 1091 (1898).
'Bollschweiber v. Packer House Hotel Co., 83 N. J. Eq. 459, 91 Atl. 1027
(1914) ; cf. State Bank v. Smith, 155 N. Y. 185, 49 N. E. 680 (1898).
'Henderson Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gregory, 16 F. (2d) 589 (C. C. A. 8th,
1928); Cunningham Hardware Co. v. Gama Trans. Co., 4 Ala. App. 561, 58
So. 740 (1912) ; American Surety Co. of N. Y. v. 14 Canal St., Inc., 276 Mass.
119, 176 N. E. 705 (1931). Contra: Savannah Ice Co. v. Canal-Louisiana
Bank & Trust Co., 12 Ga. App. 818, 79 S. E. 45 (1913).
As to type of control necessary see the following cases involving guaran-
ties: Marberry v. Ky. Union Land Co., 62 Fed. 335 (C. C. A. 6th, 1894); In re
John Rose Co., 275 Fed. 416 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); Gotschall v. Mill Factors
Corp., 289 Fed. 1005 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kiser &
Co., 91 Ga. 636, 18 S. E. 358 (1892); Mason v. Standard Distilling etc. Co.,
85 App. Div. 520, 83 N. Y. Supp. 343 (1st Dept. 1903).
The ratio decidendi in these cases was the unity of enterprise rather than
the identity of stockholders.
As to the extent of the pledge permissible see Pottlitz v. Public Utilities
Commissioner, 96 Ohio St. 49, 117 N. E. 149 (1917).




(k) Where the corporation extends financial aid to a manufac-
turer to enable him to furnish the corporation with materials essen-
tial to the corporation's functioning as a producing 3 5 or distributing 36
unit.
A further application of these principles uncovered the following
types of transactions whereby a corporation may receive remote bene-
fits only:
(a) Where a corporation pledges its credit in order to retain a
client who is in serious financial difficulty, if not insolvent; 37
(b) Where a corporation pledges its credit for the part payment
of a musical festival or other gathering to be held in the city in which
it does business for the purpose of increasing its business; 38
(c) Where a corporation assumes an obligation of a corporation
controlled by one of its officers; 39
(d) Where two corporations engaged in unrelated enterprises
have common stockholders, and either of the two issues bills or notes
for the benefit of the other; 40
(e) Where a corporation indorses for the benefit of a stock-
holder, even though he be a principal stockholder; 41 and
(f) Where a corporation makes a loan of its credit for the pur-
pose of benefitting its officers, agents or employees, and nothing more
is shown. 42
'Irwin v. Colburn, 56 Cal. App. 41, 204 Pac. 551 (1922) ; Bacon v. Mon-
tauk Brewing Co., 130 App. Div. 737, 115 N. Y. Supp. 617 (1st Dept. 1909).
Whitehead v. American Lamp & Brass Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 581, 62 Atl. 554
(1905); Holmes, Booth & Haydens v. Willard, 125 N. Y. 75, 25 N. E. 1083
(1891).
' Proctor v. Opelousas Ins. Agency, Inc., 181 La. 79, 158 So. 627 (1934).
' Military Interstate Assoc. v. Savannah etc. Ry., 105 Ga. 420, 31 S. E.
200 (1898) ; Davis v. Old Colony Ry., 131 Mass. 258, 41 Am. Rep. 221 (1881) ;
Davis v. Smith American Organ Co., 131 Mass. 255 (1881) (reported with
preceding case) cf. Richelieu Hotel Co. v. International Military Encampment,
140 Ill. 248, 29 N. E. 1044 (1892) (guaranty by a hotel company of part of the
expenses of a nearby exhibition upheld) ; B. S. Green Co. v. Blodgett, 159 Ill.
169, 42 N. E. 176 (1895) (a subscription to a post office building was held valid
as tending to increase the number of people who would pass the store of the
subscriber, which store was located nearby).
'In re John Rose Co., 275 Fed. 416 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
"'In re John Rose Co., 275 Fed. 416 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921) ; In re Gilchrist
Co., 284 Fed. 664 (C. C. A. 1st, 1922); Robert Gair Co. v. Columbia Rice
Packing Co., 124 La. 193, 50 So. 8 (1909).
"in re McLean Store Fixtures Corp., 70 F. (2d) 217 (C. C. A. 1st,
1934); Cook v. American Tubing & Webbing Co., 28 R. I. 41, 65 Atl. 641
(1905); cf. N. Y. Stock Corp. L. § 59. But cf. Nat. Bank of Commerce of
Denver v. Allen, 90 Fed. 545 (C. C. A. 8th, 1898).
"6 FLETCHEaR, op. cit. supra note 12, at 374. Contra: Liability of a Cor-
poration on Its Guaranty of Anotier's Obligation (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 1080,
which contends that, "Guaranties made for the purpose of benefiting employees
have caused little difficulty * * * ", and cites M. Burg & Sons v. Twin City etc.
1938]
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Whether a corporation receives a direct benefit by pledging its
credit for another's benefit as a means of enabling that other to pur-
chase its goods is a question as to which there is much diversity of
opinion.43 In these doubtful cases, guiding principles have proved to
be of little or no value. However, it is likely that the courts will adopt
the same reasoning applied in similar cases involving guaranties, and
resolve this question in the affirmative.44
Where a corporation issues or indorses bills or notes in connec-
tion with a transaction which is without the defined scope of its busi-
ness, the act is unquestionably ultra vires.45  A corporation has no
authority to become party to negotiable paper, accommodation or
otherwise, for a purpose foreign to the objects for which it was
created.46
II.
The second sentence of Section 55 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law sets forth the liability of an accommodation party: "Such a
person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstand-
ing such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him to be
an accommodation party." The Negotiable Instruments Law defines
person to include "a body of persons, whether incorporated or not." 47
Judicial pronouncement supports the conclusion that Section 55 refers
to corporations as well as to individuals. 48  Therefore, it would seem
that this second sentence of Section 55 should operate as the sole de-
terminant of the liability of corporate accommodation parties. Yet
the authorities are in accord in holding that this section was not de-
signed to change the law relative to corporate accommodation obliga-
tions; 49 that the legislature did not thereby intend to extend the au-
Co., 140 Minn. 101, 167 N. W. 300 (1918); ef. (1934) 34 MicH. L. REv. 421
(the salesman in that case was a valuable employee who had several "live
prospects").
43 11 A. L. R. 554. Contra: "There is a seeming conflict of authority on
this subject, but except for a few cases, it is more apparent than real," Woods
Lumber Co. v. Moore, 83 Cal. 497, 191 Pac. 905 (1920).
"For a host of cases see 6 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 391, 392;
28 L. R. A. (N. s.) 186, note; Note (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 1080, at 1081.
Contra: Bauman Lumber Co. v. Rierson (Tex. 1920) 221 S. W. 930, criticized
in (1920) 30 YALE. L. J. 89.
"Nat. Park Bank v. German-American etc. Co., 116 N. Y. 281, 22 N. E.
567 (1889); Arkansas Valley & W. R. R. v. F. M. Bank, 21 Okla. 322, 96
Pac. 765 (1905).
"Pearce v. Madison & I. R. Co., 21 How. 441, 16 L. ed. 184 (U. S. 1858);
Monument Nat. Bank v. Globe Works, 101 Mass. 57 (1869).
'IN. I. L. §2.
See cases cited note 7, supra.
"At common law, a corporation could not use its name by way of accom-
modations indorsements in absence of charter authorization. Aetna Nat. Bank
v. The Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 50 Conn. 167 (1882) ; Credit Co. v. Howe,
54 Conn. 357 (1886) ; Bird v. Daggett, 97 Mass. 494 (1867) ; Monument Nat.
Bank v. Globe Works, 101 Mass. 57 (1869); Nat. Bank v. Young, 41 N. J. Eq.
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thority of a corporation to the making and indorsing of accommoda-
tion instruments.50 In short, this section does not preclude a corpo-
ration from interposing the defense of ultra vires.5x And, therefore,
in the absence of charter authority to accommodate, a corporation
may set up the defense of ultra vires against a holder for value who
takes the bill or note with notice that the corporation was an accom-
modation party thereon. 2
However, a corporation is estopped from employing this defense
against a holder for value who takes before maturity without notice
of the accommodation character of the corporate obligation.53 This
estoppel is based on the proposition that corporate accommodation
paper is an example not of a want of general authority,54 but rather
of an excessive use of such authority in a particular instance. 55 "The
rule is that, where a corporation has under any circumstances power
51 (1886); City Bank v. Empire Stone Pressing Co., 30 Barb. 421 (N. Y.
1859) ; (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 680.
'J. G. Brill Co. v. Norton & Taunton Street Ry., 189 Mass. 431, 75 N. E.
1090 (1905); New Hampshire Nat. Bank v. Garage and Factory Equipment
Co., 267 Mass. 483, 166 N. E. 840 (1929); Oppenheim v. Simon Reigel Cigar
Co., 90 N. Y. Supp. 355 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 1904); BRANNAN, op. cit. mtpra
note 1, at 279.
' New Hampshire Nat. Bank v. Garage and Factory Equip. Co., 267 Mass.
483, 166 N. E. 840 (1929) ; BRANNAN, loc. cit. supra note 50, where the author
says that, **** Section 55 does not say that this additional defense cannot be
set up against a holder with notice * * *"
'Iit re Prospect Worsted Mills, 126 Fed. 1011 (D. C. Mass. 1904);
Simmons Nat. Bank v. Dilley Foundry Co., 95 Ark. 368, 130 S. W. 162 (1910) ;
Bell Bros. Marble Co. v. American Securities Co., 36 Ga. 340, 136 S. E. 541(1927); J. G. Brill Co. v. Norton & Taunton Street Ry., 189 Mass. 431,
75 N. E. 1090 (1905); Boston Box Co. v. Shapiro, 249 Mass. 373, 144 N. E.
233 (1924); Pierce, Butler & Pierce Mfg. Corp. v. Daniel Russell Boiler
Works, Inc., 262 Mass. 242, 159 N. E. 625 (1928) ; National Bank of Newport
v. H. P. Snyder Mfg. Co., 117 App. Div. 370, 102 N. Y. Supp. 478 (4th Dept.
1907).
'In re McLean Store Fixtures Co., 70 F. (2d) 217 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934);
Rothstein v. Gorsberg, 303 Ill. 619, 136 N. E. 481 (1922) ; Bissell v. Mich.
South. and N. I. R. Co., 22 N. Y. 289 (1860); Mechanics Bldg. Ass'n v. N. Y.
and S. White Lead Co., 23 How. Pr. 74, aff'd, 35 N. Y. 505 (1866); Nat.
Park Bank v. German-American etc. Co., 116 N. Y. 281, 22 N. E. 567 (1889) ;
Rosenthal v. 34th St. Shop, Inc., 129 Misc. 822, 222 N. Y. Supp. 733 (1927);
Chase Nat. Bank v. Rosenbaum, 142 Misc. 349, 254 N. Y. Supp. 573 (1931);
Nat. Bank of Shamokin v. Waynesboro Knitting Co., 314 Pa. 365, 172 Atl.
131 (1934) ; Jefferson Bank v. Chapman-White-Lyons Co., 122 Tenn. 415, 123
S. W. 641 (1924); Morton v. Lovell Bldg. Co., 43 Wyo. 82, 297 Pac. 799
(1931). See 1 DANIEL, op. cit. supra note 3, 505 et seq.; 3 TnoamPsoN, loc. cit.
supra note 11.
As a rule corporations have authority to issue and indorse negotiable
instruments in the due course of their business. -See 6 FLETCHER, op. Cit. supra
note 12, at 440.
' Hummel v. Warren Steel Casting Co., 5 F. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 8th,
1925); Monument Nat. Bank v. Globe Works, 101 Mass. 57 (1869); Bissell v.
Mich. South. and N. I. R. Co., 22 N. Y. 289 (1860) ; Rosenthal v. 34th Shop,
Inc., 129 Misc. 822, 222 N. Y. Supp. 733 (1927); Gaston & Ayres v. J. I.
Campbell Co., 164 Tex. 576, 140 S. W. 770 (1911) ; Eastern Counties Ry. v.
Hawkes (1855) 5 H. L. Cas. 331; BRANNAN, op. cit. suprca note 1, at 278.
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to issue negotiable paper, a bona fide holder for value, taking the
paper before maturity, has the right to presume that it was issued
under circumstances which gave the requisite authority." 56
When a corporation binds itself by accommodation paper with-
out authority, the right of a holder for value to recover obviously de-
pends on whether or not he had notice that the corporation was ac-
commodating another. Notice may be either actual or constructive.57
At the trial, the burden of proving the accommodation character of
the corporate obligation is upon the corporation.5" After the corpora-
tion sustains the burden of proving that it was an accommodation
party, the burden of coming forward with the evidence shifts to the
holder who must show that (1) he was a holder for value, and (2) he
became such without notice that the corporation was an accommoda-
tion party.59 Thus, where the form of the instrument or the nature
of the transaction charges the holder with knowledge that the corpo-
ration may have been an accommodation party, and the corporate de-
fendant proves the accommodation nature of its obligation, as well as
the absence of a charter provision permitting such obligations, judg-
ment will lie in favor of the corporation. 0 However, where the cor-
poration had charter authority to become accommodation party to
negotiable paper, it is liable to a holder for value on such paper, even
though he knew that the corporation was only an accommodation
party.61 Under such circumstances, the act of accommodation would
be intra vires; it is permitted by the charter. Under any other cir-
cumstances, the execution or indorsement of accommodation paper by
'°Rosenthal v. 34th Shop, Inc., 129 Misc. 822, 222 N. Y. Supp. 733
(1927). Also see Bissell v. Mich. South. and N. I. R. Co., 22 N. Y. 289, 290(1860).
For examples of constructive notice see 6 FLETCHER, Op. Cit. supra note
12, at 464. "As to whether plaintiff had notice that the note was indorsed for
accommodation was a question for the determination of the jury under the
evidence." Rosenberg v. Bekenstein, 211 App. Div. 791, 208 N. Y. Supp. 309
(1st Dept. 1925).
O'Brien v. Turner, 174 Wash. 266, 26 P. (2d) 641 (1933) ; Abbott v. Le
Provost, 166 App. Div. 40, i51 N. Y. Supp. 616 (1st Dept. 1915) semble;
BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 270 (an indorser has the burden of proof
that he signed for accommodation) ; cf. McLean v. Ryan, 36 App. Div. 281,
55 N. Y. Supp. 232 (2d Dept. 1890) (individual accommodation indorser).
" Nat. Bank of Newport v. H. P. Snyder Mfg. Co., 117 App. Div. 370, 102
N. Y. Supp. 478 (4th Dept. 1907); Abbott v. Le Provost, 166 App. Div. 40,
151 N. Y. Supp. 616 (1st Dept. 1915); Durbrow v. Swedish Iron & Steel
Corp., 95 Misc. 160, 158 N. Y. Supp. 701 (1916); cf. It re Troy and Cohoes
Shirt Co., 136 Fed. 420 (D. C. N. Y. 1905).
' Bell Bros. Marble Co. v. American Securities Co., 36 Ga. 340, 136 S. E.
541 (1927) ; J. G. Brill Co. v. Norton & Taunton Street Ry., 189 Mass. 131, 75
N. E. 1090 (1905) ; Pierce, Butler & Pierce Mfg. Corp. v. Daniel Russell
Boiler Works, Inc., 262 Mass. 242, 159 N. E. 625 (1928).
' Bennett v. Corporation Finance Co., Inc., 258 Mass. 306, 154 N. E. 835
(1927). Accord: Banker's Trust and Audit Co. v. Hanover Nat. Bank of
N. Y., 35 Ga. App. 619, 134 S. E. 195 (1926).
NOTES AND COMMENT
a corporation is ultra vires,62 and the corporation is liable only to
those who take without notice.
III.
In a recent case, Dench and Hardy Co. v. Hanson, Inc.,33 plain-
tiff, the second indorser of a promissory note, brought an action
against the first indorser, a corporation, to recover the amount paid
the holder after protest. The answer of the defendant corporation
alleged that at the time the plaintiff received and indorsed the note
plaintiff had knowledge that the defendant's indorsement was an ac-
commodation indorsement and that the defendant had received no con-
sideration.64 This allegation was based solely on the fact that at the
time the note was delivered to the plaintiff by the maker it had there-
on the indorsement of the defendant corporation.
At the trial the plaintiff placed the note in evidence, proved the
authority of the executing officer to execute and indorse negotiable
instruments on behalf of the defendant and also proved that it was
a holder for value.. The defendant corporation then moved for a dis-
missal, on which motion decision was reserved, and rested without
offering any evidence. Both sides moved for judgment and the trial
court granted judgment in favor of the defendant. On. appeal to the
First Department of the Appellate Division, held, reversed, and new
trial granted.
The court opened its opinion by saying: "It is not disputed that
the indorsement by the respondent corporation was an accommodation
indorsement." 65 But it would seem to be disputed; seriously dis-
puted. There is no doubt but that the burden of proving want of
consideration is upon the self-styled "accommodation party".66 And
' Thomas v. E. G. Curtis Sons Co., 7 F. Supp. 114 (D. C. Mich. 1934) ;
Bell Bros. Marble Co. v. American Securities Co., 36 Ga. 340, 136 S. E. 541
(1927); Talmadge v. Clewiston Iron Co., 252 Ill. App. 508 (1929); Joseph
Mazer Co. v. Blauer-Goldstone Co., 259 Ill. App. 305 (1931); Black Hawk
Nat. Bank v. Monarch Co., 201 Iowa 240, 207 N. W. 121 (1926); Fremont
Nat. Bank v. Ferguson Co., 127 Neb. 307, 255 N. W. 39 (1934) ; Nat. Bank of
Shamokin v. Waynesboro Knitting Co., 314 Pa. 365, 172 Atl. 131 (1934) ; Food
Products Co. v. Pierce, 154 Va. 74, 152 S. E. 562 (1930) ; American Nat. Bank
& Trust Co. of Danville v. Kushner, 162 Va. 378, 174 S. E. 777 (1934);
O'Brien v. Turner, 174 Wash. 266, 24 P. (2d) 641 (1933); Morton v. Lovell
Bldg. Co., 41 Wyo. 81, 297 Pac. 799 (1931).
'247 App. Div. 355, 287 N. Y. Supp. 435 (1st Dept. 1936).
It is interesting to note that the record reads as follows: "* * * that the
respondent's indorsement was an accommodation and that respondent had
received no consideration therefor." Obviously, the confusion still persists.
See notes 2 and 5, supra.
'Plaintiff did not concede this fact. Cf. Nat. Bank of Newport v. H. P.
Snyder Mfg. Co., 117 App. Div. 317, 102 N. Y. Supp. 478 (4th Dept. 1907),
where, only after the corporation submitted evidence showing that it received
nothing whatever for the note did the court say: "We start, therefore, with the
fact established that the note was accommodation paper * * *
'See cases cited note 58, supra.
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the defendant corporation was not relieved of that burden merely be-
cause the form of the note gave the plaintiff notice that the defendant
corporation may have been an accommodation indorser. Notice that
a fact might exist is not equivalent to notice of the existence of such
fact. And nothing appears from the record on the subject of con-
sideration.67 The court's position is rendered even more untenable
by the statutory presumption that every person, whose signature ap-
pears on a negotiable instrument, is presumed to have become a party
thereto for value.68
In the course of its opinion the court quotes the following, ap-
parently with approval, from the Pennsylvania case of Putnam v.
Ensign Oil Co.: 69 "As to him (holder in due course), the accom-
modation maker. (corporation) is liable on the instrument, notwith-
standing that at the time of taking the instrument he knew the maker
was only an accommodating party." This case, which has been
severely criticized, 70 was "explained"--actually overruled-by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1934.71
From a review of a number of leading Massachusetts cases, 72
the court in the principal case concludes that the mere showing by the
corporation that it is an accommodation indorser is not a sufficient
defense, even as against a holder with notice; that the corporation
must go further and allege and prove that the indorsement is ultra
vires."3 This is undoubtedly the law in New York as well as in Mas-
sachusetts. But when the court, depending on an ill-considered
' Shientag, J., sitting with the Appellate Term (1st Dept. April, 1935)
dissented: "* * * on the -ground that the defendant corporation by relying
solely upon the fact that the indorsement was on the note prior to its delivery
by the maker, did not show that its indorsement was without consideration and
thus for accommodation."
N. I. L. § 50; TEX. REv. ST. 1925 art. 5933, § 24; Breckenridge Hotel Co.
v. J. M. Radford Grocery Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) 35 S. W. (2d) 464 (the
statutory presumption that every person who signs is presumed to have become
a party for value, excluded any presumption that corporation indorsing note
was an accommodation indorser). But see City Court's ruling on Dench &
Hardy Co. v. Hanson, Inc. in N. Y. L. ., Nov. 10, 1934.
'272 Pa. 301, 116 Ati. 285 (1922).
"OBRANNAN, o. cit. supra note 1, at 279. In (1929) 9 BOST. L. Ray. 299,
it was said: "The reasons offered by the Pennsylvania court seem to be reasons
why these conclusions reached should not have been adopted."
' Nat. Bank of Shamokin v. Waynesboro Knitting Co., 314 Pa. 365, 172
Atl. 131 (1934), where the court said: "* * * in that case (Putnam v. Ensign
Oil Co.), we did not decide that, where a holder in due course knew that the
accommodation party had no power to accommodate, this knowledge would not
be a bar to recovery."
Cosmopolitan Trust v. S. Voremberg Co., 245 Mass. 317, 139 N. E. 482
(1923); Boston Box, Inc. v. Shapiro, 249 Mass. 373, 144 N. E. 233 (1924);
Bennett v. Corporation Finance Co., Inc., 258 Mass. 306, 154 N. E. 835 (1927)
New Hampshire Nat. Bank v. Garage and Factory Equip. Co., 267 Mass. 483,
166 N. E. 840 (1929).
' " See cases cited in notes 52 and 62, supra.
[ VOL. 12
NOTES AND COMMENT
dictum in Bacon v. Montauk Brewing Co.,74 states that, "Not every
accommodation indorsement by a corporation is ultra vires", and
"that the indorsement of the note in suit might have been in further-
ance of the respondent's corporate business", it is apparent that it
does not grasp the significance of the Massachusetts rule--of the ma-jority rule. That rule holds that, in order to establish a defense good
as against a holder for value who takes with notice, the corporation
must prove that (1) it performed an act of accommodation, and (2)
such act was ultra vires in the sense that it was not specially provided
for by charter.75 In New Hampshire Nat. Bank v. Garage and Fac-
tory Equipnent Co., 76 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
allowed the corporation to set up the defense of ultra vires against a
holder with notice, but only after deciding that, "Although the point
is rather close, we are of the opinion that the corporate powers did
not extend to the making of accommodation indorsements." And in
Bennett v. Corporation Finance Co., Inc.,7 7 the same court held that,
since the defendant by its charter could indorse notes for the accom-
modation of others, an act of accommodation would not be ultra vires.
The failure of the Appellate Division to follow this reasoning closely
accounts for the court's startling contention that an accommodation
indorsement by any corporation is intra vires, if it is in furtherance
of the corporate business. But--"A corporation would not be an ac-
commodation party * * * where it signs or indorses the instrument
in order to accomplish legitimate objects of its own." 78
From a casual reading of Dench and Hardy Co. v. Hanson, Inc.,
one might well reach the conclusion that New York no longer ac-
cepts the majority rule. But this is not so. There was no evidence in
that case that the corporation was an accommodation party. There-
fore, all that the court said in reference to corporate accommodation
paper was dicta.
Conclusions.
1. Section 55 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is declaratory
of the common law rule that accommodation is not a defense against
"In Bacon v. Montauk Brewing Co., 130 App. Div. 737, 115 N. Y. Supp.
617 (1st Dept. 1909), Loughran, J., said: "I am also of the opinion that the
learned referee erred in finding that there was no consideration for the execu-
tion of these notes." Therefore, the corporation was not an accommodation
party, and the court's discussion of the authority of a corporation to accommo-
date was dictum.
' See cases cited note 62, supra.
'267 Mass. 483, 166 N. E. 840 (1929).
=258 Mass. 303, 154 N. E. 835 (1927).
¢s 6 FLETCHER, Op. cit. supra note 12, at 457. For a list of cases see supra
notes 25 to 36, inclusive.
In Fremont Nat. Bank v. Ferguson Co., 127 Neb. 307, 255 N. W. 39(1934), it was said that, "A contract reasonably adopted for the protection of
corporate assets is not accommodation paper."
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a holder for value who had notice of the accommodation.79 But this
section was framed to cover the general law of accommodations and
not the special case of a corporation doing an ultra vires act. As a
result, the stringent common law principles relating to corporate ac-
commodations remain controlling to this very day. A failure to appre-
ciate this fact naturally results in confusion. It goes without saying
that the defects in this section should be called to the attention of the
legislature.
2. The common law rule is based on orthodox principles of
ultra %ires. When this rule was adopted corporations were not so
numerous. But at the present time corporations control the vast
majority of business enterprises. And negotiable instruments exe-
cuted, accepted and indorsed by corporations constitute the great bulk
of commercial paper. In order to satisfy the needs of modem busi-
ness the negotiation of such commercial paper must be facilitated so
far as possible. The prevailing rule, permitting the corporate accom-
modation party to set up the defense of ultra vires against a holder
with notice, acts instead as a clog on free transferability. However,
individual and isolated decisions 80 discarding this rule are not desir-
able inasmuch as they ignore the primary purpose of the adoption of
the Negotiable Instruments Law, i.e., "to remove confusion and un-
certainty which might arise from conflict of judicial decisions amongst
the states." 81 The proper solution lies either in the abolition of the
doctrine of ultra vires 5 2 or in the revision of Section 55.
3. The teeth of the common law rule were supplied by a strict
construction of the charter terms. During the past fifty years, the
courts, cognizant of the needs of expanding business, performed dental
extractions by resorting to a liberal construction of charters. From
this practice ensued the direct benefit theory. This theory may be
expressed as follows: where the obligation is incurred in good faith
and in the due course of the corporate business, for the purpose of
directly promoting or protecting such business, the corporation is not
an accommodation party, and this is so irrespective of what the actual
result of the transaction may be.8 3 In applying this theory the courts
"BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 279.
Dench & Hardy Co. v. Hanson, Inc., 247 App. Div. 355, 287 N. Y. Supp.
435 (1st Dept. 1936); Putnam v. Ensign Oil Co., 272 Pa. 301, 116 Atl. 285
(1923).
' Union Trust Co. v. McGinty, 212 Mass. 205, 98 N. E. 679 (1912).
"For a list of states which have adopted such legislation see 1 PRAsHrrvER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1st ed. 1937) 471 et seq.
""While the party's intent may be to aid the maker of the note by lending
his credit, if he seeks to accomplish thereby legitimate objects of his own, and
not simply to aid the maker, the act is not for accommodation." Bazer v.
Crummitt, 16 La. App. 613, 135 So. 54 (1931). "* * * if his primary aim is
to secure a legitimate object for himself, and his secondary intent is to aid the
maker, he is not an accommodation party within the statute." Gardner v.
Holcomb (Cal. App. 1927) 255 Pac. 523.
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lay stress upon the substance and not the form of the transaction. If,
in the particular transaction, the corporation has the requisite author-
ity to extend its credit outright, it may do so indirectly, and the exten-
sion of credit may take any form.84 In cases where there is doubt as
to whether the corporation was directly interested in the transaction,
business custom operates as a make-weight factor.85 Stockholders and
creditors of corporations cannot be heard to complain that this prac-
tice exposes them to undue risks. If the character of the corporate
officers does not afford the desired protection, such protection may be
obtained in the form of a surety bond.
4. The enactment of remedial legislation has been postponed by
the adoption of the direct benefit theory.
HAROLD PELLER.
TORT LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS.
The doctrine of liability of manufacturers to remote purchasers
and users of articles, who have suffered injury therefrom, has found
a permanent place in our jurisprudence. There can be no question
of the fact that manufacturers are in some cases liable to the con-
sumer, whether the latter is in privity of contract with the manufac-
turer or not. The difficult problem is unfolded in an attempt to de-
termine the extent of the liability and to establish principles which
will enable us to forecast when a manufacturer will be held liable to
a remote consumer, and when he will be relieved of such liability.
There is little or no question concerning the manufacturer's lia-
bility to one who purchases directly from him. His liability in such
a case is established simply by showing a warranty, either express or
implied, or some negligence in the manufacture of the article which
resulted in harm to the purchaser. When such a situation arises the
problem is elementary. On proof of the breach of the warranty or of
the duty to use care the manufacturer is held liable.
The law is not nearly so well settled when the plaintiff has not
purchased directly from the manufacturer but from a retailer, who may
have bought from the manufacturer, or from a wholesale distributor.
The early cases brought into our law the proposition that privity of
contract is necessary to recover in tort against the maker of a chattel.
Winterbottom v. Wright I is generally regarded as the first case to
14 Cf. Rabatt, Power of Corporations to Execute Guaranties (1897) 33
Am. L. R. 363.
'Wheeler, Osgood & Co. v. Everett Land Co. 14 Wash. 630, 45 Pac. 316(1896); (1926) 30 YALE L. J. 89.
' 10 M. & W. 109 (1842) (The plaintiff driver of a stage coach sought to
recover from a contractor who had agreed with a third party to keep the stage
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